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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN E. MAXFIELD, as Guard- 1 
ian ad Litem for LAURIE ANN J 
MAXFIELD, / 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I Case No. 
vs. / 13955 
KENNETH 0. FISHLER, \ 
Defendant and Respondent. J 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action arising out of 
the alleged failure of the respondent physician to dis-
cover and treat a physical ailment of the appellant infant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft, presiding, dismissed the appellant's 
claim for failure to prosecute. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has failed to state important facts rele-
vant to this appeal and a more complete and accurate 
statement is therefore necessary. The parties will here-
inafter be designated as they appeared in the trial court. 
The facts relating to the merits of the plaintiff's 
claim are not in issue on this appeal and can be briefly 
summarized. The plaintiff's child, Laurie Ann Maxfield, 
was born under the care of an obstetrician on Decem-
ber 10, 1967, in the Latter-day Saints Hospital in Salt 
Lake City. [E. 25] Laurie's mother arranged for the 
defendent pediatrician, Dr. Kenneth Fishier, to begin 
caring for the infant after her birth and Dr. Fishier 
examined her on December 10, 1967. [E. 28]. The ini-
tial examination revealed nothing remarkable and, dur-
ing the next three years, Dr. Fishier occasionally ex-
amined the child and treated her for various ailments. 
[E.28]. 
In August, 1970, the plaintiff informed Dr. Fishier 
that the child was having to urinate with unusual fre-
quency. Dr. Fishier examined a urine specimen which 
was found to be normal, but, when the problem per-
sisted, he referred the plaintiff to a urologist, Dr. Paul 
Clark. Dr. Clark diagnosed a partially constricted 
urethra and admitted the child to the Primary Children's 
Hospital for a urethrotomy. At the time of surgery, 
Dr. Clark observed that the child's labia were fused 
together and only a small pinpoint opening allowed 
urine to pass. [B. 21]. A labiaplasty was performed 
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and the dilation procedure of the urethra was then com-
pleted without complication. [E. 21]. 
On October 18, 1972, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
alleging that Dr. Fishier was negligent in failing to ob-
serve the adherent labia and that the delay in correct-
ing the condition caused the subsequent urethral hypo-
plasia, as well as other physical and emotional damage. 
[E. 110], The complaint was served on October 23, 1972. 
[E.106]. 
On November 13, 1972, the defendant answered the 
complaint and, since the plaintiff resided in Arizona, 
the defendant filed a notice requiring security for costs 
pursuant to Eule 12(j), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure. 
[E. 101-103]. The plaintiff failed to file a bond within 
one month as required by Eule 12(j) and, on December 
26, 1972, the defendant moved for a dismissal. [E. 
99-100]. The court ordered the plaintiff to file a bond 
by January 3, 1973, but, subject to compliance with its 
order, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. 
[E. 98]. The record contains no evidence or indication 
that the plaintiff filed a security for costs in accordance 
with the court's order. 
On January 9, 1973, the defendant filed a notice 
for the taking of the plaintiff's deposition. [E. 96]. Mr. 
Fullmer objected to the date of the scheduled deposition 
and, at his request, the deposition was rescheduled and 
taken on January 25, 1975 [E. 93-95]. 
On March 14, 1974, after the plaintiff had failed to 
take any action on the case for more than a year, the 
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defendant submitted interrogatories and requested a 
trial setting in order to move the case forward. [R. 87, 
90-92], Mr. Fullmer objected to the interrogatories on 
the grounds that he had insufficient time in which to 
answer and objected to the request for a trial setting 
on the grounds that discovery had not been completed. 
[R. 88-89]. Neither objection was noticed for hearing 
and a trial date was set for October 29, 1974. [R. 87.5]. 
The plaintiff answered the interrogatories two months 
later on May 16, 1974, although the answers were not 
filed until October 24, 1974. [R. 72-73]. , 
Supplemental interrogatories were submitted to the 
plaintiff on May 20, 1974. [R. 84-86]. After waiting 
nearly five months for the plaintiff to supply answers, 
defendant moved for an order compelling discovery on 
October 18, 1974, eleven days prior to trial. [R. 77]. 
Mr. Fullmer failed to appear at the hearing and the 
court ordered that answers to the supplemental inter-
rogatories be filed no later than October 24, 1974, or 
the plaintiff's claim would be dismissed. [R. 74]. The 
plaintiff submitted answers on October 24, 1974. [R. 
69-71]. 
On the morning of trial, the plaintiff's counsel and 
the infant's parents were present, as were the defendant 
and his attorney. [R. 13]. Just prior to commencement 
of the jury trial, Mr. Fullmer requested a conference 
with the Court and counsel in chambers. [R. 13]. Plain-
tiff's counsel informed the court that he had hoped to 
present medical evidence concerning the condition and 
care of the child through the testimony of the urologist, 
4 
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who had treated her four years earlier. [R. 13]. Plain-
tiff's counsel had attempted to serve Dr. Clark with 
a subpoena four days prior to the trial, but Dr. Clark 
was then out of town and would not return in time to 
testify. [R. 13]. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that he had 
not contacted any other medical witnesses and none was 
present for trial to testify concerning the medical com-
munity's standard of care for treatment in such cases 
and the child's current condition and prognosis. [R. 13]. 
The plaintiff's counsel therefore moved for a contin-
uance. [R. 13]. 
r Upon inquiry by the court, plaintiff's counsel ad-
mitted that he had never contacted Dr. Clark to arrange 
his testimony nor had he notified him of the scheduled 
trial date. [R. 14]. He had also made no effort to 
secure the attendance of physicians in Arizona who had 
treated the child. [R. 14]. 
The court asked plaintiff's counsel for an offer of 
proof of the testimony he expected Dr. Clark to give. 
Plaintiff's counsel conceded that Dr. Clark had previ-
ously expressed the opinion to him that Dr. Fishier 
had done nothing wrong, but claimed the plaintiff would 
testify that Dr. Clark had made contrary statements to 
her after the corrective surgery. [R. 14]. Plaintiff's 
counsel also informed the court that the child's parents 
were prepared to testify to the damage they had per-
sonally suffered by having to render additional care to 
the child. [R. 14]. When the court informed plaintiff's 
counsel that the child's parents were not parties to the 
lawsuit, he then moved for leave to amend his complaint. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[R. 14]. Plaintiff's counsel made no other offer of proof 
to support his motion for a continuance. 
r The court denied plaintiff's motion to amend the 
complaint to add additional parties because the motion, 
made on the morning of trial, came too late. [R. 14]. 
The court also determined that the plaintiff's counsel 
had failed to demonstrate due diligence and had failed 
to offer sufficient proof to justify a postponement of 
the trial and, therefore, the court denied plaintiff's mo-
tion for a continuance. [R. 15]. 
Since plaintiff's counsel had failed to secure the 
attendance of any expert to testify on the plaintiff's be-
half, the plaintiff could not present evidence needed to 
prevail and, therefore, could not proceed with the trial. 
Even though the defendant was fully prepared to pro-
ceed, since plaintiff's counsel had failed to exercise due 
diligence in preparing for the trial and had failed to 
take any reasonable measures to bring the case to a 
conclusion during the pendency of the case, the defend-
ant moved the court for an order dismissing plaintiff's 
claim for failure to prosecute. [R. 14]. 
The court found that the files and records of the 
case indicated that plaintiff's counsel had undertaken 
no discovery by deposition, interrogatories or otherwise, 
that he had been consistently dilatory in responding 
to discovery requests of the defendant and that he had 
failed to make reasonable efforts to prepare for trial 
to the detriment of the defendant who was ready to pro-
ceed. [R. 13-14]. Based on these findings, the court 
6 
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dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute 
in accordance with Eule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. [R. 15]. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE IS PRESUMED 
CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
UNLESS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS 
SHOWN. 
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim in 
accordance with the discretionary authority vested in 
the trial judge by Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. The rule states, in its relevant part: 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to 
comply with these rules or any order of court, 
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action 
or of any claim against him. 
This Court, in harmony with courts throughout the coun-
try, recognizes that the trial judge exercising such dis-
cretionary power is presumed to have acted reasonably 
and his decision will not be disturbed unless the record 
reveals abuse of discretion. 
In Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the trial judge on his own 
motion dismissed a complaint and counterclaim for fail-
ure to prosecute. Quoting the opinion in Reed v. First 
National Bank, 194 Or. 45, 241 P.2d 109 (1952), the Court 
adopted the following rule : 
7 
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In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, 
the court may proceed under the statute, or it 
may, of its own motion, take action to that end. 
In acting on its own motion, the court must pro-
ceed with judicial discretion. Its ruling will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest from 
the record that the court's discretion has been 
abused. 461 P.2d at 464-65. (Emphasis omitted). 
The appropriate standard of review in cases of dis-
cretionary dismissals was also discussed in the recent 
case of Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
In Barber, the trial court granted a default judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs because the defendant failed to 
respond to interrogatories. Conceding that the trial 
court should exercise discretion liberally in favor of 
giving parties an opportunity to a hearing on the merits, 
the Court, nevertheless, correctly held: 
In situations where the exercise of discretion is 
appropriate, considerable weight should be given 
to the determination of the trial court, whichever 
way it goes. This is true because due to his close 
involvement with the parties, the witnesses, and 
the total circumstances of the case, he is in the 
best position to judge what the interests of jus-
tice require in safeguarding the rights and in-
terests of all parties concerned. 522 P.2d at 702. 
Plaintiff cites Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 
P.2d 747 (1952) and Evcms v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d 272, 
399 P.2d 210 (1965) in support of the proposition that 
the Court should appraise a dismissal pursuant to Rule 
41(b) in a light most favorable to the losing party. 
This Court has consistently held to the contrary and 
the cases plaintiff relies upon are wholly inapplicable 
8 
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to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. In Martin and 
Evans, the trial court granted a dismissal on the merits 
because the evidence presented at trial indicated the 
plaintiffs were contributorily negligent. 
In contrast, the trial court in the instant case did 
not weigh the merits of the plaintiff's claim, but merely 
exercised discretionary power reserved exclusively to 
the court. As stated in Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 
16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), where the Court 
sustained a dismissal for failing to cooperate in discov-
ery procedures: 
Unless it is shown that his action is without sup-
port in the record, or is a plain abuse of discre-
tion, it should not be disturbed. 396 P.2d at 412. 
Since the trial court's judgment is presumed to be 
correct, the plaintiff had the burden of establishing an 
abuse of discretion but has failed to do so. 
POINT II 
THE TEIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO 
PROSECUTE. 
While it is the general policy of the Court to favor 
an adjudication of the merits in each case, the concom-
itant interests of all parties in proceeding toward a con-
clusion with reasonable dispatch must be equally pro-
tected. The facts of the instant case, viewed in light of 
precedent, clearly demonstrate that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion, but, rather, acted with judicial 
propriety. 
9 
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The determination of whether the trial court abused 
its discretion must, of course, ultimately depend upon 
the facts of each case. Nevertheless, in States Steam-
ship Co. v. Philippine Air Lines, 426 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 
1970), cited with approval in plaintiff's brief, the Court 
proposed a rule of thumb for judging the exercise of 
discretion that the defendant offers to this Court for 
its consideration. Citing the " oft-quoted" phrase of 
Judge Magruder in In Re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 
(1st Cir. 1954), the Court stated: 
[T]he exercise of discretion of the trial judge 
should not be disturbed unless there is " a def-
inite and firm conviction that the court below 
committed a clear error of judgment in the con-
clusion it reached upon a weighing of the rele-
vant factors." 426 F.2d at 804. 
The relevant factors suggested for consideration in 
cases of dismissals under Rule 41(b) were enumerated 
by the Court as follows: 
(1) the appellants' right to a hearing on its 
claim, (2) the impairment of appellees' defenses 
presumed from the unreasonable delay, (3) the 
wholesome policy of the law in favor of the 
prompt disposition of lawsuits, and (4) the duty 
of the appellant to proceed with due diligence. 
Id. at 805. 
In States Steamship, the court affirmed the dis-
missal of an action because the plaintiff failed for more 
than 13 months to respond to the defendant's interrog-
atories. The facts of the case now before this Court, 
viewed according to the above-cited standard, similarly 
compel an affirmance of the trial court's decision to 
dismiss. 
10 
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Implicit in Eule 41(b) is the duty of the plaintiff 
to prosecute his case in due course and with reasonable 
diligence. In the instant case, the plaintiff not only 
failed to do so, but actually impeded the progress of 
litigation at every step and, in the end, exposed a fatal 
lack of preparedness that precluded any attempt to pro-
ceed on the day of trial. 
The record discloses that after the complaint was 
filed initiating this action, plaintiff's counsel made no 
effort whatsoever to obtain evidence establishing a fac-
tual basis for the plaintiff's claim. No witnesses, ex-
perts or adverse parties were deposed. Plaintiff's coun-
sel did not prepare interrogatories. Indeed, no medi-
cal experts were consulted to evaluate the propriety of 
the defendant's medical care upon which the alleged 
damages are based. If such experts had been consulted, 
the claim against this defendant might have been vol-
untarily dismissed. 
In addition to demonstrating the absence of any 
effort to substantiate the merit of appellant's claim, the 
record also discloses the plaintiff's resistance to de-
fendant's efforts to move the case forward. The plain-
tiff refused to file the required undertaking for costs 
upon the request to do so and an undertaking was filed, 
if at all, only after a court order was issued. After the 
defendant deposed the plaintiff's mother, the case re-
mained dormant for a year until the defendant again 
initiated action by filing interrogatories and a request 
for a trial setting. Notwithstanding the passage of a 
year since commencement of the action, the plaintiff 
I I 
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resisted both efforts to encourage progress of the liti-
gation. Plaintiff's counsel filed objections, but failed to 
proceed even on his own objections and never requested 
a hearing to resolve them. The answers to interroga-
tories were not filed within the time required by the 
rules. Supplemental interrogatories remained unan-
swered for nearly five months until the defendant was 
forced to seek an order compelling discovery six days 
prior to trial. ^ 
The record thus demonstrates that plaintiff failed 
within the time required by the Eules of Procedure to 
respond to each and every discovery and procedural 
effort put forth by the defendant. 
On the morning of trial, the past neglect in failing 
to prepare and prosecute the plaintiff's claim was fully 
exposed. The plaintiff's counsel and the child's parents 
were present, but no medical expert had been contacted, 
interviewed, or subpoenaed for trial. 
The plaintiff's counsel presumably knew that the 
ordinary care and skill required of a doctor in the com-
munity in which he practices and proximate causation 
of the injury alleged must necessarily be established 
by expert testimony. Hug gins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 
310 P.2d 523 (1957); Marsh v. Pernberton, 10 Utah 2d 
40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959). In this case, the treatment 
of the infant's ailment and its relationship, if any, to 
the subsequent complication are not matters of common 
knowledge to laymen and do not evidence gross neglect 
or want of care and skill such as leaving medical sup-
12 
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plies in the incision of a patient and therefore, expert 
testimony of negligence and causation was essential to 
the plaintiff's case. 
Without expert testimony, since the plaintiff could 
not introduce any competent evidence demonstrating 
negligence or the extent of the damages, if any, proxi-
mately resulting from the doctor's treatment, the only 
available alternative was to seek a continuance of the 
trial. 
The trial court could have granted a trial contin-
uance in accordance with Rule 40(b), Utah Eules of 
Civil Procedure, but it properly refused to do so. The 
rule states, in its relevant part: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its dis-
cretion, and upon such terms as may be just . . . 
postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. / / the motion is made upon the ground 
of the absence of evidence, such motion shall also 
set forth the materiality of the evidence expected 
to be obtained and shall show that due diligence 
has been used to procure it. (Emphasis added). 
Since plaintiff's counsel had never contacted or in-
terviewed Dr. Clark, he was unable to offer competent 
proof concerning the testimony he was expected to give. 
More importantly, however, he could not show that due 
diligence was used to procure Dr. Clark's testimony. 
No explanation exists for the failure to interview Dr. 
Clark or to notify him of the trial date or to subpoena 
him prior to trial or to secure his deposition. 
13 
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Therefore, the trial court clearly did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for a continuance of 
the trial date. The court could have allowed plaintiff 
an opportunity to proceed with the scheduled trial, but 
it correctly chose not to permit the needless waste of 
judicial time and energy in pursuit of a futile endeavor. 
Since the plaintiff could not prove a case in the absence 
of expert testimony, the plaintiff's counsel's argument 
on appeal that he was ready to proceed is wholly con-
trived and without merit. 
When all relevant factors are considered, the record 
of this case not only supports, but clearly dictates a 
conclusion that the trial court properly dismissed the 
plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff was entitled to a rea-
sonable opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the 
case, but it was the defendant that made every effort 
to allow the plaintiff that opportunity. The plaintiff 
had two years to investigate and substantiate the alle-
gations asserted in the complaint and had nearly six 
months after knowledge of the trial date to prepare 
the case for presentation to the jury. Nevertheless, the 
record indicates that no action whatsoever was under-
taken to prove a case and, as a result, the plaintiff was 
incapable of proceeding on the date of trial. In con-
trast, the defendant initiated each and every discovery 
and procedural step necessary to bring the case to trial 
and the defense was fully prepared to proceed to the 
jury. The court and the defendant did not deny the 
plaintiff a reasonable opportunity for a hearing on the 
merits. On the contrary, the plaintiff and plaintiff's 
counsel forfeited that right by their own neglect. 
U 
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The cases plaintiff relies upon are, thus, wholly 
distinguishable from the facts relevant to this appeal. 
In McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc., 
17 Utah 2d 323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966), the Court reversed 
a default judgment entered by the court when the de-
fendants' counsel arrived at trial 27 minutes late be-
cause he had been attempting to obtain a postponement 
of the trial by seeking a writ from the Supreme Court. 
Granting the defendants a new trial, the Court stated: 
The purpose of a default judgment is to con-
clude litigation when a defendant fails to plead 
or otherwise defend an action. In such circum-
stances its use is practical and salutary. . . . This 
is not a case where the defendants had failed 
to defend. 411 P.2d at 130-31. 
In Bunting Tractor Co. Inc. v. Emmett D. Ford 
Contractors, Inc., 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 P.2d 191 (1954), 
the plaintiff failed to file a non-resident cost bond 
within one month after demand, but procured a bond 
before a motion to dismiss was filed. The Court re-
versed a dismissal with prejudice because the mere 
"deviation from form and procedure shall not work a 
forfeiture of substantive rights/ ' 272 P.2d at 192. The 
dismissal of the plaintiff's case in the instant appeal 
was not based upon a mere technical default, but rather, 
was founded upon the complete and inexplicable failure 
of the plaintiff to fulfill the obligation of prosecuting 
an action with reasonable diligence. 
The cases cited by the plaintiff in support of the 
contention that the court erred in refusing to allow the 
plaintiff an opportunity of proceeding on the date of 
15 
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trial are wholly inapplicable because the trial court 
correctly determined that the plaintiff could not have 
proved a case without expert testimony. In light of that 
finding, the trial court clearly did not deny the plain-
tiff any opportunity that had not already been for-
feited by neglect. 
The propriety of the dismissal for failure to pros-
ecute in this case is clearly illustrated by the closely 
analogous case of Baker v. Sojka, 74 N.M. 587, 396 P.2d 
195 (1964). In Baker, the plaintiff sought a continu-
ance on the grounds that the plaintiff was absent from 
the state due to illness and that an expert witness was 
on vacation and therefore unavailable. The trial court 
denied the motion and, since the defendant was ready 
for trial, the court dismissed the case for failure to 
prosecute. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the 
dismissal and observed no showing of any diligence as 
to why the expert witness had not been subpoenaed, 
why his deposition had not been taken prior to trial 
and, finally, found no evidence as to the facts to which 
the expert witness would testify. Affirming the dis-
missal, the Court stated: 
Although plaintiff characterizes the action of 
the trial judge as "arbitrary and unprece-
dented," it would seem to us that the ruling 
made by the trial court resulted from the lack 
of diligence in the prosecution of the case by 
plaintiff. Not only is there not a showing of any 
clear abuse of discretion, but, on the contrary, 
we believe the action of the trial court was a 
proper exercise of its judicial discretion. 396 
P.2d at 197. (Emphasis added). 
16 
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In Brasher Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969), the Court affirmed a dis-
missal for failure to prosecute and, in so doing, cited 
Baker with approval. In Brasher Motor, the Court con-
cluded as it should in this case : 
We believe and hold that in the instant case the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion, but on 
the contrary acted with judicial propriety look-
ing to the interests of all litigants and in pro-
moting their causes with reasonable dispatch, — 
certainly in preventing indiscriminate jostling 
and clogging of the court calendars. 461 P.2d at 
465. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial judge to dismiss the plain-
tiff's claim for failure to prosecute is eminently justi-
fied and wholly appropriate in light of the record and 
the intent of the rules of civil procedure. In order to 
protect the rights of all litigants to a resolution of 
their conflicts with reasonable dispatch, the Court must 
insist that a plaintiff prepare and prosecute his case 
with due diligence and care. 
In the instant case, the trial judge exercised ap-
propriate and sound discretion in determining that the 
plaintiff failed to fulfill the obligation owed to the 
court and to the parties of adequately prosecuting and 
preparing the case for final adjudication. The court 
below properly refused to condone the inexplicable and 
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total lack of initiative and care in prosecuting the claim 
against this defendant and correctly dismissed the case. 
The Court should affirm the order of dismissal en-
tered by the trial court. 
Bespectfully submitted, 
WOKSLEY, SNOW & 
CHEISTENSBN 
By John H. Snow 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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